Pilot version: the observatory team has reviewed these assessments; they have not yet been sent to the government bodies concerned for reply. Corrections are welcome at observatory@paxmemoria.org.
PaxMemoriaPledgeMeter Methodology

Yemen

Climate commitments in Yemen’s 2026 NDC

Yemen’s third NDC (NDC 3.0) was submitted by the Ministry of Water and Environment, Republic of Yemen, on 9 November 2026 and covers 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2035.

Overall level

No level yet

No visible progressStalledProgress seenAchieved

The needle appears once at least half the pledges are assessed; «too early to judge» does not count as assessed.

Assessed so far: YE-11 Progress seen, YE-12 Progress seen, YE-16 Cannot be verified, YE-17 Cannot be verified.

Yemen has no level yet because most of its pledges are still «too early to judge». The NDC was submitted on 9 November 2026, and we count progress from the start of its period on 1 January 2026.

The pledges

12 pledges

No condition 1

Conditional on international support 2

The document does not say 9

About the country and its NDC

Procedural obligationsNot applicable: the country is not a Party to the Paris Agreement.

Procedural obligations

Not applicable: the country is not a Party to the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement’s deadlines bind only its Parties; we go by the UNFCCC registry for this. We track the country’s pledges as it submitted them.

Country profileWhat “conditional” means in this country’s document

Climate commitments in Yemen’s 2026 NDC

Yemen’s third NDC (NDC 3.0) was submitted by the Ministry of Water and Environment, Republic of Yemen, on 9 November 2026 and covers 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2035. It aims to cut emissions by 2035 to 4.5% below business as usual unconditionally and 38% below with the required international support (PDF p. 85, printed 74). It puts emissions at 30.27 MtCO2e in the 2022 inventory and says their fall below the levels projected in the 2015 INDC largely reflects conflict-related economic contraction and fuel shortages, alongside the rapid expansion of decentralized solar energy (PDF p. 13). The NDC says Yemen “joined the Paris Agreement” (PDF p. 87, printed 76); according to the UNFCCC registry, Yemen signed the Agreement on 23 September 2016 and has not ratified it, so it is not a Party.

What “conditional” means in this country’s document

The NDC says its unconditional contribution “includes actions that can be advanced through domestic reforms, regulatory improvements, institutional strengthening, efficiency gains, and available national capacities”, while the full 38% target “depends on scaled-up international climate finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and investment support” (PDF p. 43, printed 32). Elsewhere it describes the unconditional part differently: it includes “available partner support” (PDF p. 64), its finance includes “private investment, policy measures and confirmed development cooperation” (PDF p. 77), and it is “financed from domestic resources” (PDF p. 89). The sector table shows only the full, support-dependent outcome (PDF p. 41). For adaptation, “a comparable unconditional/conditional finance split has not been specified” (PDF p. 77), so the adaptation targets are recorded as unspecified. We treat YE-01 as fully unconditional: missing it is not excused by a lack of new international support, because all four descriptions count what is already available.

Options and measures we do not trackThe NDC lists 24 mitigation projects with figures and costs in Tables 3.3 to 3.6, including 2,000 MW of utility-scale solar by 2035, 400 MW of mini-grid and off-grid systems, 400 MW of wind, 200,000 solar home systems, a 15 percentage-point cut in grid losses, 50,000 electric or hybrid vehicles and 75,000 ha of afforestation, costed at about USD 5.42 billion (PDF pp. 45–47).

The NDC lists 24 mitigation projects with figures and costs in Tables 3.3 to 3.6, including 2,000 MW of utility-scale solar by 2035, 400 MW of mini-grid and off-grid systems, 400 MW of wind, 200,000 solar home systems, a 15 percentage-point cut in grid losses, 50,000 electric or hybrid vehicles and 75,000 ha of afforestation, costed at about USD 5.42 billion (PDF pp. 45–47). It lists 23 adaptation measures in Tables 4.2 to 4.8, each with a quantity and a 2025–2035 timeline; the measures in Tables 4.2 to 4.7 are costed at USD 5.68 billion, while the programme cost of the loss and damage mechanism in Table 4.8 is “to be refined”. It calls the measures “investment areas that can be developed into programmes and projects” (PDF pp. 52–60). Annex IV repeats some in a column headed “2035 target / tracking focus”, including around 2,800 MW of renewable capacity, 100 million m³ a year of desalinated water and 15 wastewater reuse facilities (PDF pp. 95–96). We do not treat these measures as pledges: the NDC says its mitigation policies and measures support the headline target and “are not separate NDC components” (PDF p. 85), and calls its adaptation measures “investment areas” (PDF p. 52); we track only the targets that can be tested. We make an exception for the 35% renewable-electricity target (YE-08), although page 85 describes it in the same words, because the NDC calls it a “target” outside the tables (PDF pp. 35 and 87); we track it as a pledge and give the page 85 wording in its note. The 2,800 MW figure is given in the YE-08 ledger for comparison, not as a separate target. Table 3.2 gives each sector’s cut below its own 2035 business-as-usual level under the conditional target: industry 60.7%, energy 44.4% (8.29 MtCO2e), agriculture 22.0%, waste 9.9%, and land use and forestry as a sink of 0.65 MtCO2e (PDF p. 41). The NDC says sector policies are not separate NDC components and that the national inventory governs how progress is measured (PDF pp. 85 and 87), so we do not track these figures as separate pledges; the headline target is the measure. The NDC also gives an “indicative planning target” for domestic finance to cover about 25% of the combined mitigation and adaptation investment requirement, about USD 2.775 billion through 2035 (PDF p. 80); we do not treat it as a pledge because it is indicative.

What the pledges say, and do not say, about warNothing documented yet.

Nothing documented yet.

Documents submitted to the UNFCCC (6)Yemen NDC 3.0 · in force · 9 November 2026
Yemen
Yemen · 12 pledges
not yet checked against the document
The 2015 pledges: the INDCCut emissions 14% below business as usual by 2030, 1% through domestic action without conditions and 13% with international support, covering energy, agriculture and waste.

Cut emissions 14% below business as usual by 2030, 1% through domestic action without conditions and 13% with international support, covering energy, agriculture and waste.

The target year has not arrived. The INDC projected business as usual at 39.68 MtCO2e in 2025 and 43.81 Mt in 2030, and its conditional pathway reached 37.67 Mt in 2030, according to the First Biennial Update Report (PDF p. 25). NDC 3.0 carries the 2022 figure of 30.27 Mt forward as its 2025 starting value, and says this value is below the INDC’s 2025 business-as-usual projection of 39.7 Mt, its unconditional pathway of 39.5 Mt and its conditional pathway of 36.7 Mt (PDF p. 26). But the INDC pathway started from 24.18 Mt in 2010 (First Biennial Update Report, PDF p. 25), below the 2010 inventory itself, which the Third National Communication puts at 32.25 Mt net, so being below the path says little. NDC 3.0 attributes the lower emissions largely to “conflict-related economic contraction, fuel shortages, reduced electricity generation, and weaker industrial and transport activity, alongside the rapid expansion of decentralized solar energy” (PDF p. 13), and the new inventory uses newer guidelines, the “2006 IPCC Guidelines with the 2019 Refinement” (PDF p. 39). We therefore do not treat the lower figure as evidence that the pledge was implemented. NDC 3.0 has replaced these targets, raising them to 4.5% unconditional and 38% with support by 2035.

We have not yet been able to download the original INDC, submitted on 21 November 2015, because its UNFCCC archive is under maintenance, so this relies on what three later Yemeni documents report about it.

How we assess pledgesWhat the Paris Agreement binds Parties to, and what it does not

What the Paris Agreement binds Parties to, and what it does not

Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain its contributions and “shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives” of them (Article 4.2). The Agreement binds Parties to pursue measures; reaching the number itself is not a legal obligation.

Status

Not yet assessed
Extracted from the pledge text; no evidence checked yet.
Too early to judge
We researched the pledge, but the NDC is recent and there are not yet enough data on the years after it to judge it. What we found is shown as a baseline or a first step.
Achieved
An independent source or measurement shows the full target reached by or before its deadline. An official announcement alone is not enough.
Progress seen
Output has been completed since counting began, at no less than half the required pace where a pace can be computed; the target is not yet met.
Stalled
Some output was completed, but below half the pace needed to reach the target on time, or the main projects have stopped.
No visible progress
A full year after counting began there is no completed output, or published data for the period show no change or a reversal.
Cannot be verified
The pledge’s wording cannot be measured at all, or there is no way to measure it: no open data, no projects that can be tracked and no satellite imagery. This is a finding about the pledge or the means of measuring it, not a breach.

Confidence

Confirmed
Two or more independent lines of evidence agree.
Likely
Strong evidence with one stated gap.
Possible
Consistent with the evidence, not proven.
Unresolved
Checked and not settled, or cannot be checked.
Contradicted
The evidence contradicts the claim.

Full methodology →